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Abstract 
In open railway markets, coordinating train schedules at an interchange station requires 
negotiation between two independent train operating companies to resolve their operational 
conflicts. This paper models the stakeholders as software agents and proposes an agent negotiation 
model to study their interaction. Three negotiation strategies have been devised to represent the 
possible objectives of the stakeholders, and they determine the behavior in proposing offers to the 
proponent. Empirical simulation results confirm that the use of the proposed negotiation strategies 
lead to outcomes that are consistent with the objectives of the stakeholders. 
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1. Introduction 
Modern railways have been embracing new opportunities and challenges ever since the 
introduction of open access. In open railway markets, the responsibilities of infrastructure provision 
and train operation are distributed to independent stakeholders. This has led to an infrastructure 
manager (IM) selling track capacity to a group of competing train operating companies (TOCs). By 
restructuring the conventional railway markets through disintegration (hence enabling competition), 
regulatory agencies anticipate improvement on the operational efficiency in their railway markets so 
that rail transportation is more responsive to market demands. 
One approach to achieve the above objective is to promote seamless services. The availability of 
a direct transportation from source to destination is essential to compete with the door-to-door and 
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just-in-time services offered by road transportation. Consequently, removing barriers for seamless 
services becomes a key issue, especially in Australia and European countries where trains travel 
across jurisdictional boundaries. The attention on interoperability between railway markets can be 
realized from the National Competition Policy (of Australia) (BTRE, 2003) and the European Rail 
Directive 91/440/EEC (EC, 2006). However, barriers with respect to technical, corporate, 
jurisdictional and cultural interoperability have been identified as major impediments in promoting 
seamless services (Mulley and Nelson, 1997). While providing solutions for these barriers is a 
long-term process, the availability of coordinated train services between different TOCs facilitates 
the transportation across regions. In addition, even when seamless services are available, 
coordinated services can still compete with seamless services by providing an alternative choice for 
consumers.  
As passengers are often discouraged by excessive waiting time during transit, schedule 
coordination mainly aims to reduce the passenger waiting time at interchange stations. This problem 
is not novel in railways, and it has been extensively modeled and examined in conventional railway 
markets. Minimization of waiting time is usually obtained by adjusting the commencement time of 
two services so that headways and traveling times are preserved to avoid degrading the quality of 
service of individual lines (Brucker et al., 1990; Burkard, 1986; Nachtigall, 1996; Nachtigall and 
Voget, 1996). In these studies, when coordinating schedules at a single station, the arrival times of a 
line at the station have been modeled by a set of vertices of a polygon within a unit circle (Brucker 
et al., 1990; Burkard, 1986). The problem is then to minimize the total arc lengths between the 
vertices on the circumference of the circle. On the other hand, when coordinating a set of trains at 
multiple interchange stations, the problem has been shown to be NP-hard (a problem yet to be 
solved deterministically in polynomial time), and it has been solved using a branch-and-bound 
algorithm (Nachtigall, 1996) or a genetic algorithm (Nachtigall and Voget, 1996). 
Despite the effort of coordinating schedules in conventional markets, the introduction of open 
access has altered the nature of the problem. Firstly, railway lines are now operated by multiple 
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TOCs instead of a single authority. As a result, the alignment of schedules requires a mutual 
agreement from more than one party, whose operating constraints may be in conflict with those of 
the others. In addition, sensitive data, such as cost rates, are unlikely to be revealed, which means 
decisions are often made without complete information. Moreover, instead of generating a single 
solution (i.e. the optimal solution), the operators are now required to generate a set of offers for the 
negotiation process. Remodeling of the schedule coordination problem is thus essential to capture 
these new characteristics as a result of open access. 
Multi-agent systems are particularly suitable for representing distributed problems as systems of 
software agents that are capable of social-like interactions such as negotiation (Jennings and 
Bussmann, 2003). Agent modeling has found many applications in transportation systems (Böcker 
et al., 2001; Teodorović, 2003; Tsang and Ho, 2004, 2006a, b, 2008; Zhang et al. 2004). In open 
railway markets, a multi-agent system was proposed to capture the distributed nature and 
negotiation behavior (Tsang and Ho, 2006a). Further, the negotiation between an IM and a single 
TOC for track access rights allocation was modeled and examined in details (Tsang and Ho, 2004, 
2006a, 2008). A preliminary study (Tsang and Ho, 2006b) on schedule coordination was also 
performed. The study employed a simple negotiation protocol which effectively enabled TOC 
agents to propose, accept and reject offers. A negotiation strategy, called Strategy-PO (SPO), was 
then derived so that the resulting solution is guaranteed to be Pareto-optimal (i.e. a win-win 
situation) when an agreement is made. However, exhaustive searching, which lacks computational 
efficiency, was employed to generate offers during negotiation. In addition, not all TOCs are 
satisfied with reaching a Pareto-optimal agreement, but they may prefer to either exploit the 
negotiation partner for a more favorable offer (i.e. a win-lose situation) or reach an agreement 
within a few rounds of negotiations to reduce the administration cost (e.g. man-power, 
communication costs, etc.). As a result, it is beneficial to both improve the computation efficiency 
of SPO, and examine other potential negotiation strategies that can satisfy the particular needs of 
different TOCs.  
 3
The objective of this paper is to show the feasibility of modeling the behavior of TOCs in a 
schedule coordination negotiation. While developing a generic model for the coordination problem 
is beyond the scope of this paper, three negotiation strategies and an efficient algorithm for offer 
generation are proposed. Section 2 reviews the mathematical formulation of a schedule coordination 
problem involving two TOCs. Section 3 puts forward an agent negotiation model. Section 4 
examines the rationality of the negotiation behaviors through a set of simulation studies. Section 5 
presents a hypothetical case study to explore the benefits and limitations of applying the proposed 
setup for train planning in railway open markets. Section 6 delivers the conclusions. 
 
2. Schedule Coordination Problem 
2.1. Assumptions 
The schedule coordination problem described here involves the alignment of two passenger 
train services  and , operated by TOC-  and TOC-iL jL i j  respectively, at an interchange station 
X  through negotiation. It assumes that the train operators only share common information on train 
traveling times. Sensitive data, such as cost rates, are only available to the operators themselves.  
The model neglects the cost arising from the loss of punctuality of train services, which is 
usually recovered by an agreed penalty charge when forming a contract. In addition, quadratic 
function is used to model the relationship between expected passenger demand and waiting time at 
the interchange station. While it may be argued that other functions are feasible, and perhaps more 
accurate, quadratic functions are simple, and they have been employed to model passenger 
expectation on waiting and traveling times in railways (Murata and Goodman, 1998). In addition, 
regression analysis has been widely employed in transportation to obtain demand forecasts (Boyer, 
1998). Thus, in practice, the required quadratic function may be generated from regression 
techniques using data collected in surveys on passengers’ expectation. 
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2.2. Objective Function 
The objective function for TOC-  running  is defined in Equation (1). i iL
 )(),(),(max iiijiijiiii FGaGaR ζζζζζ −+=  for },2,1,0{, K∈ji ζζ  (1) 
iR  is the revenue improvement for TOC-  by coordinating its train service  with service 
, operated by TOC-
i iL
jL j , at station X . )( jiG ,i ζζ  denotes the estimated number of passengers 
transferring from  to  at iL jL X , when the commencement times of  and  are iL jL iζ  and 
jζ  respectively. Similarly, )i,j(iG ζζ  represents the expected passenger demand transferring 
from  to  at jL iL X .  is the average charge per passenger traveling with , and ia iL )F ( ii ζ  is 
the cost of idle time of rolling stock for  when the commencement time for  is iL iL iζ . 
Let  be the release date of the rolling stock of . If  commences at , then the idle 
cost of  is zero. Also, let  be the unit cost of idle time for . The idle cost is then modeled 
in Equation (2). 
iζˆ
iL
iL iL iζˆ
ic iL
  for  (2) )ˆ()( iiiii cF ζζζ −= ii ζζ ˆ≥
Let  be the time required for  to travel to it iL X  from the origin station, and  be the 
dwell time of  at 
id
iL X , then the arrival time  and departure time  of  at iA iD iL X  are 
modeled in Equations (3) and (4) respectively. , ,  and  can be similarly defined for 
. 
jt jd jA jD
jL
 iii tA += ζ  (3) 
 iiii dtD ++= ζ  (4) 
The passenger waiting time at the interchange station,  and , for transferring to and 
from  and  at 
ijw jiw
jL iL X , are expressed in Equations (5) and (6) respectively. ijκ  and jiκ  refer to 
the minimum time required to transfer to and from  and  at jL iL X .  and  are obtained ijz jiz
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by substitution with Equations (3) and (4) as ijijjij tdtz κ−−+=  and jijiiji tdtz κ−−+= . 
ijijiji zjij ADw  (5)    +−=− ζζκ−=
jiji ADw jijiji z  (6)    −= +−=− ζζκ
),( jiiG ζζ  and ),( ijiG ζζ , the expected passenger demands transferring between the two 
services, are modeled in Equations (7) and (8).  and  are the maximum expected demands 
and  and  are the waiting times when demands reach zero.  
*
ijG
*
jiG
ijwˆ jiwˆ
 ⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−= *
ˆ
1),(
ij
ij
ijjii w
GG
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⎤
⎟⎟⎠
⎞+ 2ijz
j0 ijij wz ˆ for  (7) ≤ ζ i +−ζ ≤
 ⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−= *
ˆ
1),(
ji
ji
jiiji w
GG
ζζζζ ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎟⎟⎠
⎞+ 2jiz
i jiji wz ˆ≤ for 0  (8) −≤ ζ j +ζ
The objective of TOC- i  without considering the impacts to TOC- j  is thus to maximize the 
revenue improvement in Equation (1), subject to the constraints accompanied in Equations (1), (2), 
(7), and (8). Similarly, the objective function for TOC- j  can be generated by interchanging the 
indices of  and i j . However, since the TOCs must agree on the decision variables iζ  and jζ  
together, the individual optimal solutions may not be accepted by the other TOC, but are determined 
through a negotiation process. In other words, the schedule coordination problem considered here 
differs from conventional constrained optimization problems in that not only the optimal solution 
needs to be solved, but also a set of high quality solutions are required for negotiation purpose. 
2.3. Negotiation Protocol 
Negotiation is defined as the exchange of offers in a finite number of rounds. The TOC agent 
submitting the first offer is the initiator, while the agent submitting the second one is the responder. 
An offer  at round  is modeled in Equation (9), and it consists of the proposed 
commencement times  and  of the initiator  and responder 
kO k
k
iζ kjζ i j  respectively. The revenue 
 6
improvement (utility value) for TOC-  associated with  is represented by . i
O
kO kiR
=k
2
1
mR
  (9) },{ kj
k
i
kO ζζ=
The negotiation procedure is summarized in Figure 1. Both agents share a common action set 
{PROPOSE, ACCEPT, FAILURE}. In the first round of negotiation ( ), the initiator 
generates its optimal offer in Equation (1). If it exists, it is proposed to the responder. Otherwise, no 
action is taken. In all subsequent rounds, both agents evaluate the utility value and update , 
which is the offer received that has the highest utility value  between the first round and the 
most recent round (  corresponds to the round that that has the highest utility value). In addition, 
the agent also computes the counteroffer  using a negotiation strategy. If no offer is found, the 
negotiation is terminated with action FAILURE. Where the offer exists, the agent proposes 
 if , and accepts  otherwise. 
∈Ac
1Ok =+
1
kO ˆ
k
iR
ˆ
kˆ
k
iR
ˆ
*O
*O iR
* > kˆ
2.4. Negotiation Strategies 
2.4.1. Strategy-PO 
Strategy-PO (SPO) was first proposed by Tsang and Ho (2006b), and its rationale is included 
here for the sake of completeness of discussions. In this strategy, the feasible offers are arranged in 
descending order of utility values, that is, for the initiator, , and for the 
responder, , where  denotes the ranking of the utility value. 
13
1
1
1 ...
−≥≥≥ RR
mRRR 22
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2
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SPO is intended to derive the Pareto-optimal solution. A solution is Pareto-optimal if there does 
not exist any alternative solution which improves the utility values of all negotiating parties 
(Ehtamo et al., 1996). In order to achieve Pareto-optimality, it requires both TOC agents to employ 
SPO, and the proof has been given by Tsang and Ho (2006b). 
2.4.2. Strategy-MIN 
Suppose an agent has just received an offer . In Strategy-MIN (SMIN), the counteroffer  
is derived from Equation (10), where 
kO *O
O′  and O ′′  are offers with utility values R′  and R ′′  that 
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are found by Equations (11) and (12) respectively.  is the utility value associated with the 
previous offer .  and  represent the utility values of the candidate 
offers  and  respectively. 
1−k
iR
},{ 111 −−− = kjkikO ζζ
}, 1−kji ζζ jO ζ∂
i
R ζ∂
{ 1kiζ −
j
R ζ∂
{∂ =iO ζ }, jζ=
⎩⎨
⎧
′′
′′>′′=*O
arg=
arg=
otherwise
R
1 R∂
− −
1 R∂
− −
{ iζ=
for R
{min(Rki
{min(Rki
O
O
O
iR ζ∂
jR ζ∂
 (10)  
  (11) )}
iζR′
R ′′
*
  (12) )}
jζ
SMIN attempts to reduce the concession made from the most recent offer proposed by the agent 
itself. Since the generated offers do not take the proponent’s requirements into consideration, agents 
employing this strategy are expected to make fine steps of concession during negotiation. 
2.4.3. Strategy-MAX 
Suppose an agent has just received the offer . In Strategy-MAX (SMAX), the 
counteroffer  is also derived from Equation (10), but 
}, kj
kk ζ
O R′  and R ′′  are found by Equations (13) 
and (14) respectively.  is the utility value associated with the current offer .  and  
represent the utility values of the candidate offers  and  
respectively. 
k
iR
R
R
kO
i
R ζ∂
j
O ζ =∂
j
R ζ∂
}, jζ}kjζ,{ iζiO ζ =∂ { kiζ
  (13) )}ki{max(R
{max(R
arg=
arg=
R i
′
∂ζ
R j
′′
∂ζ
R
i
−∂ζ
R
j
−∂ζ  (14) )}ki
SMAX attempts to maximize the difference of utility value from the most recent offer received 
from the proponent agent. Since the generated offers are modified from the proponent’s offers, 
which are likely to benefit to the proponent, agents employing this strategy are expected to make 
coarse steps of concession during the negotiation. 
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3. Algorithms for Generation of Offers 
Exhaustive searching was proposed by Tsang and Ho (2006b) to generate offers to the 
proponent. The algorithm intuitively generates all possible offers in the solution space and arranges 
them in descending order of revenue improvement. This algorithm both imposes a high 
computational demand, and the majority of offers are in fact not proposed because the size of the 
solution space is usually much larger than the effective number of negotiation rounds. 
In order to reduce the computation demand, a more efficient algorithm is employed in this study. 
The first stage of the algorithm generates the optimal offer by Lemke’s Complementary Pivoting 
Algorithm (LCPA) (Bazaraa et al., 1993), and the second stage adopts a heuristic searching 
algorithm to generate a set of high quality solutions. 
3.1. Lemke’s Complementary Pivoting Algorithm 
The objective function in Equation (1) contains ),( jiiG ζζ  and ),( ijiG ζζ  which represents 
the expected demands transferring between the train services. According to Equations (7) and (8), 
these demands have domains defined by ijwˆ0 ijij z ≤+−≤ ζζ  and jijiji wz ˆ0 ≤+−≤ ζζ  
respectively. When both passenger waiting times are out of these ranges, the demands cease and the 
utility value  becomes zero. When either iR ),( jiiG ζζ  or ),( ijiG ζζ  is invalid (i.e. 
1−<+− ijij z 0 ≤ζζ  or 10 −≤<+− jiji zζζ ), it corresponds to the two situations of 
unidirectional transfer. When both terms are valid, the transfer is bidirectional. In other words, the 
optimal revenue improvement *R  can be computed by Equation (15), where  is the optimal 
value for the problem  (unidirectional transfer from  to ),  is the optimal value 
for the problem  (unidirectional transfer from  to ), and  is the optimal value for 
problem  (bidirectional transfer between  and ). These three sub-problems are defined 
in Table 1.   
j→iR
ijR →
jiR ↔
jiP → iL
jL iL
jL
jL
iL
ij→
jiP ↔
P
  (15) ),,max(* jiijji RRRR ↔→→=
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When the integer constraints on iζ  and jζ  associated with Equation (1) are neglected, these 
sub-problems can be expressed in the standard form for quadratic programming in Equation (16), 
where  is the vector containing the decision variables. A summary of , ,  
and  is given in Table 2. 
T
ji ][ ζζ=x c H A
b
 }:
2
1)({min 0xbAxHxxxcx ≥≤+= ,f TT  (16) 
Although not all quadratic programming problems can be solved analytically, it has been shown 
that if  is positive semi-definite, the problem can be reduced to a linear programming problem 
supplemented by a complementary constraint, which is solved efficiently by Lemke’s 
Complimentary Pivoting Algorithm (LCPA) (Bazaraa et al., 1993). For the special case of a 
H
22×  
matrix ,  is positive semi-definite if and only if , ,  (where 
 is the element of  at row  and column 
H H 011 ≥h 022 ≥h 021122211 ≥− hhhh
ijh H i j ). As the -matrices for the sub-problems can 
be shown to satisfy this condition, LCPA is used to generate the optimal solution for the relaxed 
(non-integer) problems in Equation (1). Nevertheless, for the purpose of negotiation, it is still 
necessary to generate a sequence of offers. To obtain such a set of potential offers, a heuristic 
searching algorithm is proposed.  
H
3.2. Algorithm for Strategy-PO 
Instead of searching for the entire search space, this heuristic algorithm extracts only the portion 
of solutions satisfying Equation (17). In other words, the revenue improvement of the generated 
offers R  is no less than )100( ×α % of the optimal solution *R . 
 , for *RR α≥ ]1,0[∈α  (17) 
The search is organized as a tree diagram as shown in Figure 2. The nodes at levels 1 and 2 
correspond to the optimal solutions evaluated by LCPA. However, it should be noted that these 
solutions may be infeasible because the integer constraints on iζ  and jζ  are neglected. To obtain 
a set of solutions satisfying Equation (17), the integer constraints are considered in the nodes at 
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levels 3 and 4. 
3.2.1. Evaluation at level 3 of search tree 
At this level, iζ  is assigned (in ascending order) with an integer value to node indexed by 
. The objective is to determine the optimal solution among its leaf nodes. Since ...},2,1{=u iζ  is 
a constant at this level, the sub-problems in Table 1 are reduced to single-variable optimization 
problems of jζ  coupled with linear constraints. These are easily solved by standard constrained 
optimization techniques by finding the derivative of the cost function and comparing the utility 
values at the local maximum and the boundary cases. 
To avoid evaluating all instances of iζ , nodes are pruned by using the heuristics depicted in 
Figure 3. Each box represents the revenue improvement of a decision variable pair iζ  and jζ . In 
Figure 3a, the effects on revenue improvement associated with demands ), ji(iG ζζ  and 
),( ijiG ζζ  are shown. According to Equations (7) and (8), a unit increase in both iζ  and jζ  
results in no change in passenger demands. This forms the constant contours represented by the 
dotted lines. Also, as the revenue improvement grows when passenger demand is increased, a rise in 
),( jiiG ζζ  diagonally downwards (refer to Equation (7)) will contribute to an increase in revenue 
improvement. Similarly, a rise in )( iiG ,j ζζ  diagonally upwards (refer to Equation (8)) will 
contribute to an increase in revenue improvement. Similar sketch can be obtained in Figure 3b for 
idle cost )( iiF ζ , when considering Equations (1) and (2). 
The resulting effects of the three factors may either increase (+) or decrease (–) the revenue 
improvement. However, for the problems  and , the center box with  in Figure 
3c (where  is the commencement time corresponding to one of the node  at level 3) is 
considered. With the trends shown in Figures 3a and 3b, the utility value at the upper right diagonal 
box is always lower because the demands are constant but the idle cost is increasing. Although the 
jiP → jiP ↔
u
ii ζζ =
uuiζ
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change in the adjacent and lower diagonal boxes are uncertain, if these boxes are infeasible values 
(i.e. beyond the boundary constraints), all columns beyond  will not contain any solution 
satisfying the search criteria in Equation (17). In other words, all nodes  may be pruned if 
the condition shown in Figure 3c is detected. 
u
iζ
u
ii ζζ >
1+u
iζSimilarly, for problem  (Figure 3d), the entire column at  has the revenue 
improvement reduced, so that the columns beyond  can be pruned without the need of reaching 
the boundary constraint. 
ijP →
u
iζ
3.2.2. Evaluation at level 4 of search tree 
At this level, iζ  is inherited from the parent node at level 3, and jζ  is assigned (in ascending 
order) with an integer value to node indexed by ...},2,1{=v . Since both values are constants at 
this level, the utility of a node is directly computed by Equation (1). 
To avoid evaluating all instances of jζ , nodes are pruned when  (where  is the 
commencement time corresponding to one of the node  at level 4) if the revenue improvement 
v
jj ζζ > viζ
v
vR  at node  has already violated Equation (17). The value of  is determined by comparing 
against the boundary constraints of ,  and  in Table 1, which can be determined by 
Equations (18), (19) and (20) respectively. 
v viζ
)}
)}
jiP → i→jP j↔iP
  (18) ijiij
v
j zw −+= ζζ ˆ
  (19) 1(),min{( −−+= jiijiivj zz ζζζ
  (20) ˆ(),min{( ijiijjii
v
j zwz −−+= ζζζ
3.3. Algorithms for Strategy-MIN and Strategy-MAX 
In these strategies, the initial offer proposed in round 1 can be generated by LCPA discussed 
above. However, to ensure that the resulting offer is feasible (i.e. iζ  and jζ  satisfying the integer 
constraints), the optimal offer is obtained by comparing the direct neighboring solutions of 
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1O )}(),({ ji DnDn ζζ= , 2O )}(,1)({ ji DnDn ζζ += , 3O }1)(),({ += ji DnDn ζζ , and 
4O }1)(,1)({ ++= ji DnDn ζζ , where )(•Dn
}}4,3,2,1{|} =ii
O
 rounds down the value to the nearest integer. In other 
words, ,  . iOO =1 =i arg{max{R
O′
For the subsequent offers, according to the definitions of SMIN and SMAX, the counteroffer 
 is obtained by comparing  and *O ′′ . Since O ′′  corresponds to minimizing/maximizing the 
utility value by holding the commencement time iζ  constant for the sub-problems in Table 1, it 
can be found by standard optimization techniques as discussed at level 3 of the search tree. 
Similarly, as  corresponds to minimizing/maximizing the utility value by holding O′ jζ  constant, 
it can also be obtained by standard optimization techniques. 
 
4. Simulation Setup and Results 
The simulation set-up described below examines the performance of the strategies in terms of 
their quality of solutions and the duration of negotiations. Five cases have been constructed 
according to Table 3, and all combinations of strategy pairs are simulated in each case. If  
denotes the strategies employed by TOC-1 and TOC-2, where 
)S,(S 21
SMIN}SMAX,{SPO,S,S 21 ∈ , a 
total of nine combinations are available. 
The simulated cases represent scenarios from a spectrum of extreme conditions. In case 1, the 
traveling time of train services are set up so that, without coordination, bidirectional transfer is 
impossible. Case 2 is deliberately set up so that only unidirectional transfer can be achieved, even 
when the train services are coordinated. In case 3, the release date of TOC-1 is set to a large value to 
resemble the scenario when the two TOCs begin the negotiation with substantial operational 
differences. Cases 4 and 5 examine the consequences when the idle cost of rolling stock is high and 
low respectively. 
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4.1. Quality of Solutions  
Figure 4 displays the frequency distribution of the quality of solutions. A ‘win-win’ solution 
refers to an agreement that is Pareto-optimal. When the utility value of one TOC is improved at the 
expense of the other one, the solution is considered as ‘win-lose’. On the other hand, when the 
utility values of both TOCs are lower than the Pareto-optimal solution, these solutions are denoted 
by ‘lose-lose’. Finally, ‘none’ refers to cases that are terminated without reaching any agreement. 
4.1.1. Strategy-PO 
The solutions obtained by (SPO, SPO) are used as the reference for the other pairs since these 
solutions are by definition Pareto-optimal. While Figure 4 suggests that other strategy pairs may 
also obtain the Pareto-optimal solution occasionally, it is important to note that the concession 
curves (i.e. the sequence of proposed offers) of (SPO, SPO) are always monotonically decreasing. 
An example is illustrated in Figure 5 where the introduction of SMIN causes the utility values of 
both TOCs to ripple downwards. In other words, SPO always guarantees Pareto-optimality. 
4.1.2. Strategy-MIN 
Figure 4 also shows that the use of SMIN by at least one TOC usually results in either win-win 
or win-lose solution. In SMIN, since the generation of potential offers is restricted by holding one 
of the commencement time constant, the agent is only able to search within a limited set of offers. 
This contrasts to SPO which is capable of selecting the next best offer from the entire solution space. 
Therefore, SMIN has the risk of proposing (or revealing) a less favorable solution during the 
negotiation. In the example depicted in Figure 5, although the offer  contributes a lower 
utility value to TOC-2, the utility value of its proponent is higher. As a result, TOC-1 prefers the 
offer over the Pareto-optimal one  
}5,7{
}5,8{ .
Nevertheless, the frequency of reaching a sub-Pareto-optimal (i.e. win-lose/lose-loss) offer is 
not exceedingly high. In addition, even if the negotiation ends with a sub-Pareto-optimal offer, the 
quality of solution is usually close to the Pareto-optimal one. In this aspect, SMIN seems to be 
 14
capable of approximating the operation for SPO in most scenarios, but it introduces a small opening 
of exploiting (and being exploited by) the negotiating partner. 
4.1.3. Strategy-MAX 
According to Figure 4, more than half of the negotiations involving SMAX are 
sub-Pareto-optimal. Moreover, two negotiations have no solution. Thus, the results suggest that 
SMAX is less favorable than SPO and SMIN in terms of the quality of solution attained. 
Despite the similarities between SMAX and SMIN, there are now significantly fewer 
negotiations leading to the Pareto-optimal solution when employing SMAX. Since SMAX uses the 
proponent’s offer ( ) instead of the more favorable one ( ) when generating the counteroffers, 
it is less likely to reach the Pareto-optimal agreement. 
kO 1−kO
When using the strategy pair (SMAX, SMAX), both agents may suffer from a reduction in 
utility value because they are both manipulating the proponent’s offer to generate their counteroffers. 
In other words, neither agent is consistently benefiting from the operation. Without any logical 
modification of the counteroffers, the final agreement may eventually be unfavorable to both 
parties.  
4.2. Duration of Negotiation 
Figure 6 shows the frequency distribution of the negotiation duration. ‘Equal’ refers to the same 
number of rounds as the solution obtained by (SPO, SPO), while ‘faster’ and ‘slower’ correspond to 
requiring fewer and more number of negotiation rounds respectively. Figure 7 shows the 
distribution of the average negotiation round computed as percentage of the result obtained from 
(SPO, SPO). 
4.2.1. Strategy-PO 
As shown in Figure 6, employing SMIN or SMAX usually improves the negotiation speed. In 
fact, in the five simulated cases, (SPO, SPO) often requires a substantial number of rounds (up to 
804) before the negotiations are settled. If exhaustive search was used in the simulation instead of 
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LCPA with heuristic search, the simulation time would further be increased because an extensive 
number of evaluations is needed (Table 4). 
4.2.2. Strategy-MIN 
According to Figure 6, about half of the negotiations employing SMIN complete the transaction 
with fewer rounds. Since there is no need to propose the offers in monotonically decreasing order of 
utility values, SMIN is likely to skip some of the intermediate solutions while still being able to 
reach the Pareto-optimal or a sub-Pareto-optimal agreement. However, in the other half of the cases, 
SMIN requires the same number of rounds as the reference negotiation. As a result, SMIN may also 
be regarded as a good approximation to SPO in terms of negotiation duration.  
4.2.3. Strategy-MAX 
In Figure 6, almost all negotiations involving SMAX produce faster negotiation. The main 
reason is that the proponent’s commencement time ( jζ ) is usually unchanged as the counteroffer is 
modified from the proponent’s offer. In other words, the proponent is more likely to accept the 
counteroffer. Hence, the number of negotiation rounds is lowered. 
The average number of negotiation rounds required by SMAX is usually lower than SMIN. In 
Figure 7, when SMAX is employed as at least one of the strategies, the average number of 
negotiation round required is only 20-80% of the result employing (SPO, SPO). On the other hand, 
when SMIN is employed by one agent, the average round of negotiation required is about 80-90%.  
4.3. Remarks 
The simulation results find that SPO guarantees the Pareto-optimal solution, but it often requires 
an extensive number of negotiation rounds during negotiation. Although the offer generation 
process has already been improved using LCPA with heuristic searching algorithm, the large 
number of negotiation rounds in practice is often infeasible since it will induce a large 
administration cost (e.g. man-power and communication costs). The use of SMIN generally reduces 
the number of negotiation rounds by introducing a small opening to exploit a win-lose or lose-win 
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solution. SMAX further reduces the negotiation rounds, but it has the highest risks of reaching a 
lose-lose agreement. 
 
5. Case Study 
This section demonstrates how the developed simulation software and findings may be 
employed as a tool for planning and evaluation in practice. However, it should be clearly stated that 
the simulation data used below is hypothetically created and not collected from any official 
organizations. Thus, the results only demonstrate the applicability of the simulation models but not 
necessarily reflect any current situation. Through the following description, it is intended that the 
potential benefits and limitations of the proposed agent negotiation model will be appreciated. 
5.1. Background 
In the UK, Network Rail is the infrastructure manager, and a number of passenger train 
operating companies seek access to this network. Network Rail is responsible for managing 17 
major interchange stations. An example is the Liverpool Lime Street station. Intercity services are 
provided by TransPennine Express and Virgin Trains, while regional services are offered by Central 
Trains and Northern Rail. A schematic diagram for the lines serviced by these operators is shown in 
Figure 8. The intercity service providers compete in the northern England including cities at 
Lancaster, Preston, Liverpool, Manchester, Sheffield, Leeds, York and Newcastle. On the other 
hand, the regional services encounter only limited competition on the 
Liverpool-Manchester-Sheffield corridor. 
As a consequence, the two regional service operators may consider coordinating their schedules 
to attract an additional demand for the cross-regional services. This would create a yardstick 
competition with the seamless intercity services. For example, the journey from Preston to 
Birmingham via Virgin Trains takes about 1 hour 40 minutes while the trips from Preston to 
Liverpool via Northern Rail and Liverpool to Birmingham via Central Trains are approximately 1 
hour and 1 hour 45 minutes respectively. In other words, the minimum journey time for the 
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coordinated service is 2 hour 45 minutes. If the combined train fares for the regional services are 
lower than the intercity one, and the passenger waiting time is kept reasonably short, it is possible 
that some passengers will use the coordinated service instead of the seamless one. 
5.2. Setup 
The schedule coordination problem at the Liverpool Lime Street station involving Northern Rail 
and Central Trains is examined using the negotiation model presented in this study. It is assumed 
that the simulation is conducted from the perspective of Northern Rail whose train planners attempt 
to determine the operating conditions for its service from Preston to Liverpool if schedule 
coordination with Central Trains is possible. 
The scheduling problem is illustrated in Figure 9. TOC-1 and TOC-2 represent Northern Rail 
and Central Trains respectively. Northern Rail operates a service from Preston to Liverpool which 
requires a journey time of 60 minutes and a dwell time of 15 minutes at Liverpool station. On the 
other hand, the service provided by Central Trains from Liverpool to Birmingham consists of a 
journey time of 105 minutes and a dwell time of 10 minutes. The minimum transfer time between 
the two services is 5 minutes. Since Liverpool Lime Street is the terminal station for the Northern 
Rail’s service, the case shown in Figure 9a represents a unidirectional passenger transfer from 
Northern Rail to Central Trains. In addition, according to the past timetabling experience, the 
commencement time of the service operated by Central Trains is likely to be 70 minutes later than 
the commencement time of the Northern Rail’s service. According to Equation (5), with 
70=− ij ζζ , (Central Trains’ service departs directly from the interchange station), 0=jt 10=jd , 
, 60=it ij 5=κ , the default passenger waiting time  is computed to be 15 minutes. ijw
Suppose the current average train fares for the Northern Rail and Central Trains services are 
£8.00 and £17.00 respectively. These train fares are expected to give rise to a maximum demand of 
50 passengers when the waiting time is zero, and the demand will cease when the waiting time 
exceeds 30 minutes. Moreover, the current estimation of idle costs for the rolling stock of Northern 
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Rail and Central Trains are £20/min and £25/min respectively. The base case for the situation 
described is denoted as Case A in Table 5. Simulation of this case yields the probable outcome 
derived by negotiation. Case B refers to the situation when Northern Rail attempts to increase the 
passenger demand by reducing the average train fare by £2.00. Finally, Case C demonstrates an 
example of bidirectional transfer if the same set of rolling stock is used for the backward journey as 
shown in Figure 9b. 
Having devised the situations intended for investigation, the train planners of Northern Rail can 
generate results using agent negotiation. While it is possible to simulate the scenarios using all 
combinations of strategy pairs, the assumption is that the proponent (i.e. Central Trains) will use 
SPO to represent the fact that it has no intention to make any concession to Northern Rail. On the 
other hand, SPO and SMAX are chosen for Northern Rail to obtain the expected best and worst 
outcomes respectively. The simulation results are summarized in Table 6. 
5.3. Results and Findings 
5.3.1. Case A 
The solution obtained in this case using the strategy pair (SPO, SPO) is , meaning that 
Northern Rail is willing to postpone its service by 2 minutes, while Central Trains keep its 
commencement time unchanged. The Pareto-optimal solution has reduced the waiting time by 2 
minutes (from 15 to 13 minutes). With the balance between the income generated from an increased 
passenger demand of 40.6 and the 2-minute idle cost of rolling stock, the overall revenue gained by 
the stakeholder is found to be £289.89. On the other hand, the solution obtained from the strategy 
pair (SMAX, SPO) is . As SMAX aims to reduce the negotiation time by sacrificing 
Pareto-optimality, the commencement time for Northern Rail is further delayed to 7 minutes which 
leads to a higher idle cost. Although the passenger demand has been increased further to 46.4 (i.e. 
about 6 more passengers) due to a shorter waiting time of 8 minutes, the overall revenue gained is 
lowered to £231.56. Nevertheless, since both simulated negotiations lead to a considerable gain in 
}70,2{
}70,7{
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revenue, conducting a negotiation with Central Trains in practice seems to be beneficial. 
5.3.2. Case B 
The reduction of train fare has increased the revenue of Northern Rail to £292.80 using (SPO, 
SPO) and £250.13 using (SMAX, SPO). Although this may encourage the stakeholder to lower the 
train fare, the expected gain is not substantial (only £3 - £20). Thus, the stakeholder may retain the 
basic train fare to avoid the additional administration cost of modifying the charging scheme. 
5.3.3. Case C 
The possibility of bidirectional transfer has provided a reasonable increase in revenue for 
Northern Rail. Having an additional demand of almost 50 passengers in the backward journey, 
Northern Rail is willing to postpone the commencement time by about 20 minutes instead of only 2 
minutes in Case A.  
5.3.4. Remarks 
Based on the simulation results, the recommendation to Northern Rail is to explore the 
possibility of schedule coordination with Central Trains. Preferably, the rolling stock should also be 
used for the backward journey. However, the stakeholder should pay serious attention to the 
possible errors in their estimation or prediction (e.g. passenger demand). It is also recommended 
that Northern Rail should negotiate in a cautious manner if adequate time is available for 
negotiation. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We have presented an agent negotiation model for the schedule coordination problem in open 
railway markets. The model consists of a simple protocol and the Train Operating Company (TOC) 
agents are able to incorporate Strategy-PO (SPO), Strategy-MIN (SMIN) or Strategy-MAX 
(SMAX). The offer generation problem is resolved using Lemke’s Complementary Pivoting 
Algorithm (LCPA) with a heuristic searching algorithm, which is more efficient than exhaustive 
search. Through the negotiation process, the TOC agents are able to decide whether coordinating 
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the schedules between the train services is favorable. 
Simulations have been conducted to evaluate the Pareto-optimality and negotiation length. The 
findings confirm that SPO guarantees a Pareto-optimal (win-win) agreement but requires the 
highest negotiation demand. The performance of SMIN is similar to that of SPO but it introduces a 
small opening to exploit the win-lose or lose-win solution. SMIN is thus suitable for ambitious 
TOCs aiming to obtain a solution that is more favorable than the Pareto-optimal solution by 
exploiting the benefits of the negotiating partner. For TOCs that are keen on obtaining a deal 
quickly, SMAX is a fast means to complete a negotiation with a higher risk of reaching a lose-win 
or lose-lose agreement. 
Although the proposed model considers coordinating passenger train services, it may also be 
applied to coordinating freight train services. Instead of using passenger demands in Equation (1), 
freight demands (e.g. measured in tons) can be used. Nevertheless, since the relationship between 
demands and waiting time for freight consignments may be significantly different from that of 
passenger services, and extra costs are usually associated with handling the transfer of 
consignments, the objective function may become more complicated. In fact, the objective function, 
even for passenger train coordination, can be more complex than the model presented in this paper 
when TOCs wish to consider the dependency cost (e.g. train delays of other TOCs) or to model 
passenger demand more accurately using non-quadratic functions. In such case, a different 
algorithm is required to generate the sequence of offers, even though the agent modeling and the 
definitions on negotiation strategies remain applicable. Further research on devising more complex 
and generic objective function (hence algorithm) will greatly improve the usability of the model. 
In addition, the model has considered schedule coordination involving neither more than 2 
TOCs nor a set of regular services on different headways. Furthermore, the need for coordinating 
trains with multiple trains at multiple platforms, and the granting of track access rights by the 
Infrastructure Manager (IM) have not been considered in this study. It is therefore not our intention 
to apply the model to resolve any practical problems currently experienced by the railway open 
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markets, but to demonstrate how the objectives and behavior of the railway stakeholders can be 
captured by agent modeling. Further development based on the proposed model is believed to be a 
valuable tool to assist the planning of policy makers before the actual negotiation is conducted. 
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Table 4  Comparison of Computation Requirement between Exhaustive Search and LCPA 
with Heuristic Search 
Dimension of iζ  and jζ  Number of Nodes Evaluated 
 Exhaustive Search LCPA with Heuristic Search ( 8.0=α ) 
 60   3600   48 
120  14,400  105 
240  57,600  682 
480 230,400 2255 
 
Table 5 Simulation Setup for Schedule Coordination at Liverpool Lime Street Station 
Commencement 
time (min) 
Average Train 
Fare (£/person)
Max. Demand 
(persons) 
Idle Cost Rates 
(£/min) Case Description 
1ζˆ  2ζˆ  1a  2a  *12G  *21G  1c  2c  
A Unidirectional transfer 
Default schedules lead to 
waiting time of 15 minutes 
0 70 8 17 50 0 20 25 
B Unidirectional transfer 
Reduced train fare to 
increase passenger demand 
0 70 6 17 70 0 20 25 
C Bidirectional transfer 
Same rolling stock is used 
for the backward journey 
20 0 8 17 50 50 20 25 
 
Table 3 Simulation Setup 
 
Idle Cost 
Rates 
(£/min) 
Commencement 
Time (min) 
Average 
Train Fare 
(£/person) 
Travel 
Time from 
Origin 
(min) 
Station 
Dwell 
Time 
(min) 
Max. 
Demand 
(persons) 
Min. 
Transfer 
Time (min) 
Passenger 
Waiting 
Time 
(min) 
Case  2c  1ζˆ  2ζˆ  1a  1c 2a 1t 2t  1d 2d  *12G *21G  12κ 21κ  12wˆ  21wˆ  
1 50 60 7 5 15 22 20 30 5 7 100 80 2 2 20 20 
2 50 60 7 5 15 22 20 30 1 1 100 80 2 2 20 20 
3 50 60 60 5 15 22 20 30 5 7 100 80 8 8 20 20 
4 250 60 7 5 15 22 20 30 5 7 100 80 2 2 20 20 
5 1 60 7 5 15 22 20 30 5 7 100 80 2 2 20 20 
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Table 6 Simulation Results for Schedule Coordination at Liverpool Lime Street Station 
 Strategy Pair Case A Case B Case C 
(SPO, SPO) {2, 70} {3, 70} {39, 0} Solution 
{ 1ζ , 2ζ }/min (SMAX, SPO) {7, 70} {7, 70} {40, 0} 
(SPO, SPO) 289.89 292.80 359.11 Revenue gained by TOC-1 
1R  (£) (SMAX, SPO) 231.56 250.13 344.44 
(SPO, SPO) 789.56 999.60 1570.61 Revenue gained by TOC-2 
2R  (£) (SMAX, SPO) 690.39 1105.38 1581.94 
(SPO, SPO) 147 167 19 Number of negotiation 
rounds (SMAX, SPO) 47 57 14 
(SPO, SPO) 13 12 11 Waiting time  21 LL →
(min) (SMAX, SPO) 8 8 10 
(SPO, SPO) - - 4 Waiting time  12 LL →
(min) (SMAX, SPO) - - 5 
(SPO, SPO) 40.6 58.8 42.3 Demand for  21 LL →
(persons) (SMAX, SPO) 46.4 65.0 44.4 
(SPO, SPO) - - 49.1 Demand for  12 LL →
(persons) (SMAX, SPO) - - 48.6 
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Figure 2 Structure of Pruning Tree 
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Figure 4 Frequency Distribution of Quality of Solutions  
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Figure 5 Concession Curves in Case 2 (a) (SPO, SPO) (b) (SPO, SMIN) 
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Figure 6 Frequency Distribution of Negotiation Duration  
 
 
Figure 7 Distribution of Average Negotiation Round  
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Figure 9 Transfer at Liverpool Lime Street Station 
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